000			02930nam a22002417a 4500
003			NULRC
005			20250329110815.0
008			250329b ph ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780198843207
040			_cNULRC
050			_aHB 172 .B69 2022
100			_aBowles, Samuel _eauthor
245			_aMicroeconomics : _bcompetition, conflict, and coordination / _cSamuel Bowles and Simon D. Halliday
260			_aOxford : _bOxford University Press, _cc2022.
300			_axxx, 1035 pages ; _c25 cm.
365			_bUSD42.00
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505			_aPART I: People, Economy, and Society -- 1: Society: coordination problems and economic institutions -- 2: People: preferences, beliefs, and constraints -- 3: Doing the best you can: constrained optimization -- 4: Property, power, and exchange: mutual gains and conflicts -- 5: Coordination failures and institutional responses -- PART II: Markets for Goods and Services -- 6: Production: technology and specialization -- 7: Demand: Willingness to pay and prices -- 8: Supply: firms' costs, output, and profit -- 9: Competition, rent-seeking, and market equilibration -- PART III: Markets with Incomplete Contracting -- 10: Information: contracts, norms, and power -- 11: Work, wages, and unemployment -- 12: Interest, credit, and wealth constraints -- PART IV: Economic Systems and Policy -- 13: A risky and unequal world -- 14: Perfect competition and the invisible hand -- 15: Capitalism: innovation and inequality -- 16: Public policy and mechanism design.
520			_aThe subtitle of the work--Competition, Conflict, and Coordination--signals the authors' focus on how the institutions of a modern capitalist economy work, introducing students to recent developments in the microeconomics of credit and labor markets with asymmetric information and a dynamic analysis of how firms compete going beyond price taking, as well as bargaining over the gains from exchange, social norms, and the exercise of power. The new benchmark model proposed by Bowles and Halliday is based on an empirical approach to economic actors and problems. They start from the premise that contracts are incomplete, and that as a result market failures, rather than being a special case illustrated by environmental spillovers, are to be expected in markets for labor, credit, knowledge and throughout the economy. They explain how experiments show that human motivations include ethical as well as other-regarding preferences (rather than entirely self-interested) and explain why the technologies of knowledge-based economies are a source of winner-take-all rather than stable competition. The authors also consider the intrinsic limits of mechanism design and governmental interventions in the economy.
650			_aMACROECONOMICS
700			_aHalliday, Simon D. _eauthor
942			_2lcc _cBK _n0
999			_c2092 _d2092