Microeconomics : competition, conflict, and coordination / Samuel Bowles and Simon D. Halliday

By:

Bowles, Samuel [author]

Contributor(s):

Halliday, Simon D [author]

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: Oxford : Oxford University Press, c2022.Description: xxx, 1035 pages ; 25 cmISBN:

9780198843207

Subject(s):

MACROECONOMICS

LOC classification:

HB 172 .B69 2022

Contents:

PART I: People, Economy, and Society -- 1: Society: coordination problems and economic institutions -- 2: People: preferences, beliefs, and constraints -- 3: Doing the best you can: constrained optimization -- 4: Property, power, and exchange: mutual gains and conflicts -- 5: Coordination failures and institutional responses -- PART II: Markets for Goods and Services -- 6: Production: technology and specialization -- 7: Demand: Willingness to pay and prices -- 8: Supply: firms' costs, output, and profit -- 9: Competition, rent-seeking, and market equilibration -- PART III: Markets with Incomplete Contracting -- 10: Information: contracts, norms, and power -- 11: Work, wages, and unemployment -- 12: Interest, credit, and wealth constraints -- PART IV: Economic Systems and Policy -- 13: A risky and unequal world -- 14: Perfect competition and the invisible hand -- 15: Capitalism: innovation and inequality -- 16: Public policy and mechanism design.

Summary: The subtitle of the work--Competition, Conflict, and Coordination--signals the authors' focus on how the institutions of a modern capitalist economy work, introducing students to recent developments in the microeconomics of credit and labor markets with asymmetric information and a dynamic analysis of how firms compete going beyond price taking, as well as bargaining over the gains from exchange, social norms, and the exercise of power. The new benchmark model proposed by Bowles and Halliday is based on an empirical approach to economic actors and problems. They start from the premise that contracts are incomplete, and that as a result market failures, rather than being a special case illustrated by environmental spillovers, are to be expected in markets for labor, credit, knowledge and throughout the economy. They explain how experiments show that human motivations include ethical as well as other-regarding preferences (rather than entirely self-interested) and explain why the technologies of knowledge-based economies are a source of winner-take-all rather than stable competition. The authors also consider the intrinsic limits of mechanism design and governmental interventions in the economy.

Item type:

Books

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Home library	Collection	Call number	Copy number	Status	Date due	Barcode
Books	National University - Manila	LRC - Architecture General Circulation	Environmental Planning	GC HB 172 .B69 2022 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	c.1	Available		NULIB000020573

Includes bibliographical references and index.

PART I: People, Economy, and Society --
1: Society: coordination problems and economic institutions --
2: People: preferences, beliefs, and constraints --
3: Doing the best you can: constrained optimization --
4: Property, power, and exchange: mutual gains and conflicts --
5: Coordination failures and institutional responses --
PART II: Markets for Goods and Services --
6: Production: technology and specialization --
7: Demand: Willingness to pay and prices --
8: Supply: firms' costs, output, and profit --
9: Competition, rent-seeking, and market equilibration --
PART III: Markets with Incomplete Contracting --
10: Information: contracts, norms, and power --
11: Work, wages, and unemployment --
12: Interest, credit, and wealth constraints --
PART IV: Economic Systems and Policy --
13: A risky and unequal world --
14: Perfect competition and the invisible hand --
15: Capitalism: innovation and inequality --
16: Public policy and mechanism design.

The subtitle of the work--Competition, Conflict, and Coordination--signals the authors' focus on how the institutions of a modern capitalist economy work, introducing students to recent developments in the microeconomics of credit and labor markets with asymmetric information and a dynamic analysis of how firms compete going beyond price taking, as well as bargaining over the gains from exchange, social norms, and the exercise of power.

The new benchmark model proposed by Bowles and Halliday is based on an empirical approach to economic actors and problems. They start from the premise that contracts are incomplete, and that as a result market failures, rather than being a special case illustrated by environmental spillovers, are to be expected in markets for labor, credit, knowledge and throughout the economy. They explain how experiments show that human motivations include ethical as well as other-regarding preferences (rather than entirely self-interested) and explain why the technologies of knowledge-based economies are a source of winner-take-all rather than stable competition. The authors also consider the intrinsic limits of mechanism design and governmental interventions in the economy.

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