Handbook of computational social choice / edited by Felix Brandt [and four others]

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1 Introduction to Computational Social Choice -- 2 Introduction to the Theory of Voting -- 3 Tournament Solutions -- 4 Weighted Tournament Solutions -- 5 Dodgson's Rule and Young's Rule -- 6 Barriers to Manipulation in Voting -- 7 Control and Bribery in Voting -- 8 Rationalizations of Voting Rules -- 9 Voting in Combinatorial Domains -- 10 Incomplete Information and Communication in Voting -- 11 Introduction to the Theory of Fair Allocation -- 12 Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods -- 13 Cake Cutting Algorithms -- 14 Matching under Preferences -- 15 Hedonic Games -- 16 Weighted Voting Games -- 17 Judgment Aggregation -- 18 The Axiomatic Approach and the Internet -- 19 Knockout Tournaments.

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.